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Abstract—This paper considers the security issue of practical
distributed storage systems (DSSs) which consist of multiple
clusters of storage nodes. Noticing that actual storage nodes
constituting a DSS are distributed in multiple clusters, two novel
eavesdropper models - the node-restricted model and the cluster-
restricted model - are suggested which reflect the clustered nature
of DSSs. In the node-restricted model, an eavesdropper cannot
access the individual nodes, but can eavesdrop incoming/outgoing
data for Lc compromised clusters. In the cluster-restricted model,
an eavesdropper can access a total of l individual nodes but
the number of accessible clusters is limited to Lc. We provide
an upper bound on the securely storable data for each model,
while a specific network coding scheme which achieves the upper
bound is obtained for the node-restricted model, given some mild
condition on the node storage size.
I. INTRODUCTION
A distributed storage system (DSS) is a network of relatively
inexpensive storage nodes to save data reliably over a long
period of time. A good example is the large data centers
which use storage nodes widely spread over the Internet [1],
[2]. Since these storage nodes are made of commodity storage
devices, they often fail to provide high reliability. In order to
support reliable storage, a DSS provisions the node repairing
process in the case of node failure events. If an active node
fails, a newcomer node joins the system by downloading data
from some of the remaining active nodes.
When a DSS is composed of insecure storage nodes, system
security must be guaranteed in the presence of the threat of
an intruder. Many researchers have studied ways to secure
DSSs against possible intruders [4]-[6]. Roughly, intruders
can be classified into two types. One is active intruders
who can possibly change stored data in the system, and
the other is passive eavesdroppers who can only read data
stored in the system. The present paper focuses on the passive
eavesdropper model. An eavesdropper model for a DSS is
typically designed as a node-based intruder, which can read
stored data and downloaded data (during the repair process)
for certain compromised storage nodes [5], [6].
In the real world, storage nodes in the data centers are
divided into many clusters called the racks [7]. A node in
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the rack can only communicate with nodes in other racks
via top-of-rack switches [8]. Considering a real world DSS,
the existing eavesdropper models may not fully capture the
behavior of real intruders. In this paper, we introduce two
eavesdropper models - ‘node-restricted’ and ‘cluster-restricted’
- which reflect the clustered nature of the DSS.
In the node-restricted model, Lc clusters are compromised
by eavesdroppers, who cannot access the individual storage
nodes residing in the clusters. The eavesdroppers in this model
can read the data transmitted during the node repair processes,
both incoming and outgoing data for the compromised clusters.
This model applies to the scenarios where an eavesdropper can
only read data transmission passing through the top-of-rack
switches. The cluster-restricted eavesdropper is an intruder
who can access the individual nodes, while the number of
accessible clusters is limited to Lc. This model pertains to the
scenarios where the clusters are dispersed widely, so that the
eavesdropper can hardly access the entire clusters. Although
we mainly visualize the rack as a cluster in this paper, the
application of the suggested models is not constrained to
the multi-rack structure; the models can be used for general
clustered DSS scenarios.
The main contribution of this paper is to design and an-
alyze the two eavesdropper models well-suited to clustered
distributed storage systems. We also provide upper bounds
on securely storable data for the suggested eavesdropper
models. Furthermore, an explicit coding scheme to achieve
the theoretical limit of secrecy capacity is suggested in the
node-restricted model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
dynamic structure of the distributed storage system and secrecy
capacity. In Sections III and IV, we suggest and analyze
two eavesdropper models. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section V.
II. BACKGROUNDS
A. Distributed Storage Systems
A DSS is a network of storage nodes used to store data.
Suppose a source has an incompressible file F that needs to
be stored in the system. The source encodes a file to ensure
reliability and distributes to a certain number n of storage
nodes, each of which has a storage size α. The system is
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Fig. 1: Information flow graph for D(n = 4, k = 3) with
d = 3
designed in a way that any users (also called data collectors)
can read the original file F by contacting any choice of k < n
storage nodes.
However, individual storage nodes in a DSS frequently fail
to provide reliable information to the data collector, degrading
the reliability of the system. In order to store data for a long
period of time, the node repair process is required to keep n
active storage nodes. When an active storage node fails, an
inactive node in the system receives information from d < n
active nodes to newly join the system. Let the total amount
of data that the newcomer node receives to join the system be
γ (total repair bandwidth), and the contribution of each active
node be β = γ/d. We denote a DSS with parameters n, k as
D(n, k).
B. Information Flow Graph
A DSS can be represented as an information flow graph in
the sense that it can describe a flow of information between
storage nodes [3]. The graph consists of three types of nodes: a
source node, data collector nodes and storage nodes. A source
node stores the encoded file into multiple storage nodes. The
data collector nodes receive the data from storage nodes to
reconstruct the original file. Each storage node vi is divided
into the input storage node vini and the output storage node
vouti . They are connected by a directed edge with capacity α
to represent the storage size of a node.
In Fig. 1, the encoded file gets stored into n storage nodes.
An edge with infinite capacity connects the source node and
each storage node vi for i = 1, . . . , n. When a node fails, a
newcomer node joins the system by receiving information β
from d active helper nodes. This is illustrated as d edges with
capacity β. A data collector node connects to k active nodes
by edges with infinite capacity to reconstruct the original file.
A cut between a source node and a data collector is defined
as a set C of edges which satisfies the following: every directed
path from the source to the data collector must pass at least
one edge in C. The minimum cut C∗ is defined as a cut C
separating the source and the data collector with the smallest
sum of edge capacities.
Due to the dynamic nature of the failure events and the
repair processes in a DSS, the number of possible flow graphs
of a DSS can be infinite. The authors of [3] has shown that
if a minimum cut value separating a source node and a data
collector node is larger than or equal to certain amountM (for
all possible flow graphs), there exists a linear network coding
scheme to store data M to a DSS.
C. Eavesdropper Model and Secrecy Capacity
In a DSS, an eavesdropper is typically viewed as a passive
intruder who can access the individual storage nodes and read
the data from the compromised nodes without altering them.
It is generally assumed that an eavesdropper has a complete
knowledge of the storage system and the repair scheme in the
case of node failure. The eavesdropper models for a DSS are
suggested in [5] and [6], where both models assume that the
intruder can access the individual nodes. The eavesdropper in
[5] is characterized by a parameter l < k which represents the
power of the intruder. She is able to read the downloaded data
(during the node repair process) as well as stored data from l
compromised nodes. Therefore, an eavesdropper may choose
to intrude the currently active nodes or temporary inactive
nodes which will read the message during the node repair
process. On the other hand, the authors of [6] distinguished
the intrudable storage nodes into two types: one can read the
stored data only, while the other can read both the stored data
and the downloaded data. We basically adopt the eavesdropper
model suggested in [5] for Section IV.
The maximum amount of information that can be stored
with perfect secrecy against the eavesdropper is defined as
the secrecy capacity Cs(α, γ). In [5], an upper bound of the
secrecy capacity is derived as
Cs(α, γ) ≤
k∑
i=l+1
min{(d− i+ 1)β, α}. (1)
This upper bound is calculated as the minimum cut value of
the information flow graph excluding the compromised links.
Although calculating the exact value of the secrecy capacity
for an arbitrary DSS still remains as an open problem, the
authors of [10] provided an explicit coding scheme to achieve
the upper bound when the storage size α is sufficiently large.
III. NODE-RESTRICTED EAVESDROPPER MODEL
To begin with, a model for clustered DSSs is introduced
with appropriate parameters. A clustered DSS is defined as a
DSS consisting of multiple clusters where a single cluster has
multiple storage nodes. We assume that every cluster has the
equal number of active storage nodes. We use the parameters L
and nI = n/L to represent the number of total clusters and the
number of active storage nodes in each cluster, respectively.
In a node repair process, increasing the number d of helper
nodes is always beneficial in terms of the amount of securely
stored data in the system [5]. Thus we assume that d has the
maximum possible value n−1 throughout the paper. Also, we
assume that the failed node and the corresponding newcomer
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Fig. 2: The node-restricted eavesdropper model. The eaves-
dropper can read incoming/outgoing data for compromised
clusters but cannot access the individual nodes.
node reside in the same cluster to keep the consistent number
of nodes across clusters.
In this section, we suggest a node-restricted eavesdrop-
per model wherein the intruder cannot access the individual
nodes but read data transmission between different clusters.
In Hadoop distributed file systems [7], [9] as well as other
large scale data centers, storage nodes are dispersed to multiple
racks to easily deal with a large number of storage nodes. The
nodes within the same rack are connected via a top-of-rack
switch to enable communication of nodes in different racks.
Communication between two nodes residing in the same rack,
however, does not need to go through a switch. It is reasonable
to assume that an eavesdropper compromises the top-of-rack
switches which are the cores of the cross-rack communication.
In this case, the eavesdropper cannot read individual nodes
but may access the information passing through the switches.
To this end, we develop a node-restricted eavesdropper model
with parameter Lc, the number of compromised clusters (top-
of-rack switches).
Theorem 1. (Node-restricted eavesdropper : upper bound of
secrecy capacity with maximum helper nodes) For a clustered
distributed storage system D(n, k) with Lc ≤ L compromised
clusters, the secrecy capacity Cs(α, γ) is upper bounded by
Cs(α, γ) ≤

Lc
∑nI
i=1min{(nI − i)β, α}
+
∑k
i=nILc+1
min{(n− i)β, α}, nILc < k
bk/nIc
∑nI
i=1min{(nI − i)β, α}
+
∑mod(k,nI)
i=1 min{(nI − i)β, α}, otherwise
(2)
where β = γ/d.
Proof. Case 1) nILc < k.
Let the encoded file be distributed into n storage nodes
v1, v2, . . . , vn. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn}. Assume that nodes
v1+(i−1)nI , . . . , vinI reside in the ith compromised cluster for
1 ≤ i ≤ Lc. Assume nodes v1, v2, . . . , vk fail consecutively
and then are replaced by vn+1, vn+2, . . . , vn+k via the suc-
cessive node repairing processes as shown in Fig. 3.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the edges coming into vinn+i from v ∈ V can
be divided into two types: the solid edges connecting the nodes
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Fig. 3: Information flow graph used in proving Theorem 1.
in the same cluster and the dotted edges connecting the nodes
in different clusters. The node-restricted eavesdropper can only
read cross-cluster communication. Therefore, the solid edges
represent information which is not read by the eavesdropper.
Assume that the data collector reconstructs the orig-
inal file by contacting k nodes, vn+1, vn+2, . . . , vn+k.
Let Ci be the maximum amount of secure informa-
tion that can be transmitted from the node vn+i to the
data collector. Then, the amount of information securely
stored in the system is upper bounded by the entropy
H(C1, C2, . . . , Ck) =
∑k
i=1H(Ci|C1, . . . , Ci−1). Note that
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, H(Ci|C1, . . . , Ci−1) can be cal-
culated as the minimum value associated with the incoming
solid edges to vn+i as well as storage size of node vn+i
(from Fig. 3). Thus, we complete the proof by specifying each
H(Ci|C1, . . . , Ci−1) value.
Case 2) nILc ≥ k.
The upper bound of secrecy capacity can be proved in a
similar way by letting the nodes v1+(i−1)nI , . . . , vinI be in
the ith compromised cluster ( 1 ≤ i ≤ dk/nIe).
Fig. 4 shows the relationship between the number of
compromised clusters and the upper bound of the secrecy
capacity. The capacity C(α, γ) =
∑k
i=1min{(n − i)β, α} is
the maximum amount of data that can be stored in a DSS
without considering the eavesdropper [3]. The upper bound
CUs (α, γ) denotes the RHS of inequality (2).
It is shown that the upper bound derived in Theorem 1 can
be achieved in the bandwidth-limited regime (when the size of
storage nodes α is large enough) by an explicit coding scheme,
called the RSKR [10] repetition code. The RSKR repetition
code is a network coding scheme where each encoded symbol
is stored on exactly two nodes while any choices of two
storage nodes share one coded symbol (Fig. 5). This coding
scheme also achieves the upper bound on secrecy capacity of
the eavesdropper model in [5].
Here we provide an example of the RSKR repetition code
which achieves the upper bound derived in Theorem 1. Con-
sider a DSS D(n = 6, k = 5), with d = 5, α = 5, β = 1, L =
3 and Lc = 1 (Fig. 5). One can store C(α, γ) = 15 symbols
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Fig. 5: Example of RSKR network coding in a DSS D(n =
6, k = 5) with d = 5, L = 3, α = 5 and γ = 5
in the system, and securely store at most CUs (α, γ) = 7
symbols. Let the seven information symbols I = {I1, . . . , I7}
be encoded to 15 symbols. For convenience, we classify
15 encoded symbols into 2 groups, S = {S1, . . . , S3} and
T = {T1, . . . , T12}. A source distributes 15 encoded symbols
in the following manner. Every element in the set S is
duplicated and stored in two nodes in a cluster, while different
elements in S are stored into distinct clusters. Every element in
the set T is duplicated and stored in two nodes which reside in
different clusters. The distributed 15 encoded symbols satisfy
the RSKR property as in Fig. 5.
Since the encoded symbols in the set S is not transmitted
across the cluster during the repair process, the node-restricted
eavesdropper cannot access the encoded symbols in the set S
regardless of the choices of compromised clusters. Therefore,
three symbols in S are stored in the system without the encod-
ing process. Notice that the eavesdropper with Lc = 1 can read
at most 8 encoded symbols in the set T regardless of the choice
of the compromised cluster. This problem can be viewed as
the wiretap channel II [11] with the parameter (N = 12,
µ = 8), where N is the length of the encoded bits and µ is the
number of eavesdropped bits by the intruder. Thus, N−µ = 4
information symbols can be securely encoded in T with perfect
secrecy. In summary, three (uncoded) information symbols
in S and four information symbols which are encoded in T
are securely storable. The total number of secure information
symbols are equal to 7, which coincides with the upper bound
of Theorem 1.
We can expand the example for general parameters n,L and
Lc. We may assume that β = 1; generalization to arbitrary β
is easy by applying the same coding scheme parallelly. For a
distributed storage system D(n, k = n − 1) with the α ≥ dβ
condition (i.e., the bandwidth-limited regime), C(α, γ) =(
n
2
)
and CUs (α, γ)= Lc
(
nI
2
)
+
(
n−nILc
2
)
. Suppose the RSKR
coding scheme is applied. Let the set S be the collection of
symbols stored in two distinct nodes within the same cluster,
and T be collection of symbols stored in two nodes residing in
different clusters. Then, |S| =L(nI2 ), |T | =(n2)−L(nI2 ). The
symbols in S cannot be exposed to the eavesdropper, while
at most
∑Lc
i=1 nI(n − inI) symbols in T may be exposed to
the eavesdropper. Therefore, the number of symbols securely
stored in the system is |S| + |T | −∑Lci=1 nI(n − inI). With
simple calculation, it is easy to verify that this value is equal
to CUs . Thus, we conclude that the RSKR repetition code
achieves the upper bound in Theorem 1 in the bandwidth-
limited regime.
We expect another advantage of the RSKR repetition code
based on its ability to make use of different data types. Notice
that the encoded symbols in the set S can be systematically
stored in the DSS. The data collector can reconstruct a symbol
in S by contacting a single node. However, each symbol in the
set S is stored in a single specific cluster, so that the failure
event of the cluster causes irreversible data loss. The encoded
symbols in the set T are stored in a non-systematical way, so
that the data collector should contact a sufficient number of
nodes to collect the data in T . On the other hand, the data
encoded in T is safe against any single cluster failure event.
Therefore, data which is frequently used but less important can
be recommended to be stored in the set S, while important data
which is not frequently used (such as private information) can
be stored in the set T .
IV. CLUSTER-RESTRICTED EAVESDROPPER MODEL
We introduce a cluster-restricted eavesdropper model and
provide an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the sug-
gested model. As discussed, this type of eavesdropper can
access individual l ≤ k storage nodes in the system; however,
the number of clusters that she can access is limited by Lc ≤ L
(Fig. 6). Here, we basically adopt a node eavesdropper model
suggested in [5]. In other words, the suggested model with
constraint Lc = L reduces to the eavesdropper model in [5].
Trivially, inequality l ≤ nILc is always satisfied.
A. Symmetric Repair Model
The symmetric repair model is a node repair model where
every newcomer node receives the equal amount of informa-
tion β from d helper nodes during the node repair process.
8Intrudable clusters
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Fig. 6: The cluster-restricted eavesdropper model. The eaves-
dropper can access individual nodes, but only a limited number
of clusters.
The secrecy capacity of the cluster-restricted model with
eavesdropper (l, Lc) is upper bounded as follows.
Cs(α, γ) ≤
k∑
i=l+1
min{(n− i)β, α} (3)
Let the RHS of inequality (3) be denoted as CUs (α, γ). Notice
that the upper bound CUs (α, γ) is consistent with the result
of [5], irrespective of Lc. This result is due to the fact that
every choice of compromised nodes in a clustered DSS equally
affects the amount of securely storable data in the symmetric
repair model.
B. Asymmetric Repair Model
Recently, a new repair model suitable for a clustered DSS
was studied in [12]. The main idea of the suggested repair
model is to distinguish the repair bandwidth β, depending
on the relative location of the failed node and the helper
node. If the newcomer node and the helper node are located
in the same cluster, a helper node transmits βI information.
Otherwise, a helper node transmits βc information to the
newcomer node. Considering a typical scenario of having
larger intra-cluster communication bandwidth compared to the
cross-cluster bandwidth, it was assumed that βI ≥ βc. This
repair model can be viewed as a generalized version of the
symmetric model in [3]. Under this setting, the total repair
bandwidth of the asymmetric repair model is expressed as
γ = γI + γc, where γI and γc are overall intra-repair and
cross-repair bandwidths.
Theorem 2. (Cluster-restricted eavesdropper: upper bound
of secrecy capacity in asymmetric repair model with maxi-
mum helper nodes) For a clustered distributed storage system
D(n, k) with l compromised nodes and Lc compromised
clusters, the secrecy capacity Cs(α, γI , γc) is upper bounded
by
Cs(α, γI , γc) ≤
nI∑
i=1
g(i)∑
j=f(i)+1
min{x(i)γI+y∗(i, j)γc, α} (4)
where
f(i) =

f1(i), Lc ≤ bk/nIc
f2(i), Lc > bk/nIc, l ≤ mod(k, nI)(bk/nIc+ 1)
f3(i), otherwise
(5)
f1(i) =

Lc, i ≤ bl/Lcc
l − Lcbl/Lcc, i = bl/Lcc+ 1
0, otherwise
f2(i) =

g(i), i ≤ b lbk/nIc+1c
l − bk/nIcb lbk/nIc+1c, i = b lbk/nIc+1c+ 1
0, otherwise
f3(i) =

g(i), i ≤ b l′bk/nIcc+mod(k, nI)
l′ − bk/nIcb l′bk/nIcc, i = b l
′
bk/nIcc
+mod(k, nI) + 1
0, otherwise
g(i) =
{
b knI c+ 1, i ≤ mod(k, nI)
b knI c, otherwise
x(i) =
nI − i
nI − 1
y∗(i, j) = 1− (l − i) + (
∑i−1
m=1 {g(m)− f(m)}+ j − f(i))
n− nI
l′ = l −mod(k, nI)(bk/nIc+ 1)
We denote the RHS of inequality (4) as CUs (α, γI , γc),
an upper bound of the secrecy capacity of the system. The
result of Theorem 2 is derived by showing the following: 1)
For any choice of k distinct storage nodes, 2) any choice of
l compromised nodes satisfying Lc constraints and 3) any
failure and repair order of storage nodes, the minimum cut
value of the information flow graph G is greater than or equal
to the RHS of inequality (4).
The proof is omitted due to space limitation, but here we
provide a sketch of the proof. The full proof is available
elsewhere. CUs (α, γI , γc) is derived from the specific flow
graph G∗ and obtained by minimum cut analysis. We show
that the minimum cut of possible flow graph (after removing
compromised edges) is greater than or equal to the minimum
cut of G∗. Firstly, we figure out the optimal ordering of
the failed nodes (similar to the vertical ordering in [12])
which minimizes a minimum cut value with any choice of
k distinct storage nodes and any choice of l compromised
nodes satisfying the constraint Lc. Secondly, we find the
optimal choice of choosing l eavesdropper nodes to minimize
a minimum cut value with any choice of k storage nodes
and the optimal ordering method. Finally, we find the optimal
choice of choosing k storage nodes to minimize a minimum
cut value with the optimal choice of l eavesdropper nodes and
the optimal ordering method.
One way to design the flow graph G∗ satisfying the equality
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min-cut value in the asymmetric repair model for D(n =
20, k = 15) with L = 5. The eavesdropper reads l = 5 nodes
inside the Lc = 2 clusters. The failure order of k = 15 nodes
are specified inside the nodes.
condition is given as follows. Let storage nodes v1, . . . , vk fail
successively and be replaced by the nodes vn+1, . . . , vn+k.
The data collector gathers information by connecting k re-
placed storage nodes, vn+1, . . . , vn+k. The corresponding k
failed nodes v1, . . . , vk are selected such that the k failed nodes
belong to dk/nIe compromised clusters and bk/nIc clusters
are full of failed nodes. Then, choose l eavesdropper nodes as
vn+1, . . . , vn+l. The corresponding failed nodes v1, . . . , vl are
chosen to satisfy the number constraint Lc and they are evenly
spread across Lc clusters. Finally, select the failed nodes
vl+1, . . . , vk successively such that in each of the k − l − 1
steps taken, the node in the cluster with a maximal number
of remaining unfailed nodes is chosen. This procedure is
illustrated in Fig. 7.
C. Discussions on Cluster-Restricted Eavesdropper
The upper bound of the secrecy capacity CUs is a monotonic
non-increasing function of l and Lc. The power of eaves-
dropper becomes stronger with larger l and Lc, which results
in small CUs . Fig. 8 shows values of C
U
s in the bandwidth-
limited regime for a fixed number of compromised nodes l
with changing Lc values. Notice that CUs in the symmetric
repair model is independent of Lc as confirmed in Section
IV-A. However, CUs is a decreasing function of Lc in the
asymmetric model.
Since the cross-cluster repair bandwidth γc is typically
oversubscribed by a factor of 5− 20 [8], reducing γc is quite
demanding. It is shown in [12] that γc can be arbitrary reduced
by spending more resources: the total repair bandwidth or the
node storage size. We simulated under a γc = 0 constraint in
Fig. 8 to reduce the traffic passing the top-of-rack switches.
Notice that reducing the amount of cross-cluster communica-
tion traffic incurs a cost in terms of the amount of securely
storable data in the system.
V. CONCLUSION
We have introduced two eavesdropper models - the node-
restricted model and the cluster-restricted model - which
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Fig. 8: CUs (α, γI , γc) (for a cluster-restricted model) of a
clustered DSS D(n = 100, k = 80) in the bandwidth-limited
regime, L = 10, l = 10 and γ = 1
reflect the clustered nature of data centers in the real world.
For each model, an upper bound of secrecy capacity is derived.
Furthermore, an explicit coding scheme to achieve the upper
bound is suggested for the node-restricted model. Considering
a realistic scenario where coded data blocks are allocated in
multiple racks, the amount of securely storable data against
an eavesdropper can be evaluated using our results. Analysis
on the optimal dispersion strategy of coded blocks in multi-
rack scenario as well as securely storable data against active
adversary remains as an interesting future work.
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